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RULEMAKING AND THE ADMINISTRATIVE
PROCEDURE ACT
Richard J. Pierce, Jr.t
Government agencies have been issuing rules since the earliest days of the
Republic. Congress instructed the President to issue rules to provide pensions
for disabled veterans of the Revolutionary War in an Act of September 29,
1789. The tremendous increase in the size and scope of the federal government
during the twentieth century has increased dramatically the number of rules
issued by federal agencies.' The Code of Federal Regulations now occupies
many feet of library shelf space, and it contains only the most important agency
rules. Every major agency has a file room full of interpretative rules, character-
ized variously as staff manuals, design criteria, advisories, policy statements,
enforcement guides, etc.
As Peter Strauss has shown, the history of rules and rulemaking in the
U.S. legal system is characterized by powerful ambivalence rooted in two con-
flicting characteristics of our political and social culture.2 We place a high val-
ue on efficiency, fairness, and accountability. Rules and rulemaking further
those values? Yet, we harbor a deep distrust of government and government
officials. That distrust induced the Framers to create a government that consists
of three independent branches, each with enough power to serve as an effective
check on the exercise of the powers conferred on the other two branches. Our
distrust is particularly apparent in the procedures required to enact a statute. A
t Lyle T. Alverson Research Professor of Law, George Washington University; B.S. Lehigh Univer-
sity, 1965; J.D., University of Virginia, 1972.
1. See 1 KENNETH CuLp DAVIS & RICHARD J. PIERCE, JR., ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE § 1.4 (3d
ed. 1994).
2. See Peter L. Strauss, The Rulemaking Continuum, 41 DuKE L.J. 1463 (1992).
3. See I DAvis & PIERCE, supra note 1, § 6.7.
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bill can become law only by navigating a tortuous course through both Houses
of Congress and the President. It should come as no great surprise that our
distrust of government also manifests itself in the context of agency rules and
rulemaking. The most important category of agency rules, legislative rules, have
effects that are functionally indistinguishable from those of statutes.4
The history of rulemaking reflects the tension between the cultural values
that lead us to place a high value on rules and the cultural values that cause us
to distrust the individuals and institutions that are the source of rules. In this
brief historical overview, I will describe the ebbs and flows in the U.S. legal
system's treatment of rules and rulemaking with reference to periods in which
we appear to embrace rules enthusiastically and periods in which we appear to
erect insurmountable obstacles to the issuance of rules. A careful reader will
detect a high degree of artificiality and overlap in my historical treatment, how-
ever. In truth, at all times there exist powerful social forces that are simulta-
neously pulling the legal system toward polar extremes: maximizing the issu-
ance of rules to enhance efficiency, fairness, and accountability, and minimizing
the issuance of rules to guard against the risks of tyranny. There is no reason to
expect the future of rules and rulemaking to differ materially from its history in
this respect.
THE APA's TREATMENT OF RULES AND RULEMAKING
The Administrative Procedure Acte ("APA") legitimized the issuance of
rules,6 provided a taxonomy of rules,7 prescribed the procedures for issuing
rules of various types,8 and established standards applicable to judicial review
of rules.' The APA recognizes several categories of rules. Legislative rules
have effects that are indistinguishable from statutes.'0 Interpretative rules and
general statements of policy bind agency employees but do not bind members
of the public."
The APA does not require an agency to use any procedures before it issues
an interpretative rule or a general statement of policy." An agency must use
one of two three-step procedures before it issues a legislative rule. 3 The first
procedure, referred to as informal rulemaking, requires: (1) the issuance of a
notice of proposed rulemaking; (2) the provision of an opportunity for submis-
sion of comments by interested members of the public; and (3) the issuance of
4. See id. § 6.5.
5. Administrative Procedure Act, ch. 324, 60 Stat. 237 (1946) (codified as amended in scattered sec-
tions of 5 U.S.C.).
6. See 5 U.S.C. §§ 551(4), 552(a)(1)(D) (1994).
7. See 5 U.S.C. § 553(b)(3)(A).
8. See 5 U.S.C. § 553.
9. See 5 U.S.C. § 706.
10. See I DAVIS & PIERCE, supra note 1, § 6.5.
11. See id. §§ 6.2-.3.
12. See 5 U.S.C. § 553(b)(3)(A).
13. See 5 U.S.C. § 553. See also 1 DAVIS & PIERCE, supra note 1, §§ 7.2-.4.
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the rule, incorporating a concise, general statement of its basis and purpose. 4
The second procedure, referred to as formal rulemaking, is identical to the first
with one critical exception: the agency must provide an opportunity for an oral
evidentiary hearing instead of an opportunity to submit written comments. 5
The APA subjects rules issued through use of informal rulemaking to judicial
review through application of an arbitrary and capricious standard, 6 while it
subjects rules issued through use of formal rulemaking to the presumably more
demanding requirement that the agency's findings of fact must be supported by
substantial evidence.
17
The APA does not address explicitly many of the questions that have
become important to the viability of rules and rulemaking, however. These
include: When can an agency use informal rulemaking rather than formal
rulemaking? Can a reviewing court compel an agency to add procedural safe-
guards to those required by the APA? What does the arbitrary and capricious
test require in the context of agency rulemakings? When can a court review a
rule? At whose behest can a court review a rule? Courts have provided defini-
tive answers to some of these questions while others continue to be subject to
vigorous debate today."
AGENCY USE OF RULEMAKING AFTER ENACTMENT OF THE APA
Agencies made little use of rulemaking in the first two decades following
enactment of the APA. The New Deal agencies viewed themselves as akin to
special purpose courts. They eschewed the opportunity to issue rules in favor of
near exclusive reliance on adjudicatory proceedings. 9 Their choice of proce-
dures has been implicated as one of the major causes of their poor perfor-
mance." Their pattern of decisionmaking was often ad hoc and unprincipled.
The Supreme Court criticized their adjudicatory hearings as "nigh intermina-
ble."'" By the time they completed a case, the "facts" the agencies "found"
were ancient history. When they acted on the assumption that those "facts" bore
some relation to current reality, their actions had severe adverse effects.22
14. See 5 U.S.C. § 553(c). See also 1 DAVIS & PIERCE, supra note 1, § 7.2.
15. See 5 U.S.C. § 553(c). See also 1 DAVIS & PIERCE, supra note 1, §§ 7.3-.4.
16. See 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A). See also 2 DAVIS & PIERCE, supra note 1, § 11.2.
17. See 5 US.C. § 706(2)(E). See also 2 DAVIS & PIERCE, supra note 1, § 11.2.
18. See infra text accompanying notes 40-108.
19. See generally JAMES M. LANDIS, REPORT ON REGULATORY AGENCIES TO THE PRESIDENT-ELECT
(1960); 1 DAVIS & PIERCE, supra note 1, § 1.5.
20. See Richard J. Pierce, Jr., The Choice Between Adjudicating and Rulemaking for Formulating and
Implementing Energy Policy, 31 HASTINGS L.J. 1, 48-53 (1979); SENATE COMM. ON GOVERNMENTAL AF-
FAIRS, 4 STUDY ON FEDERAL REGULATION, DELAY IN THE REGULATORY PROCESS, S. Doc. No. 95-72 (lst
Sess. 1977); STEPHEN G. BREYER & PAUL W. MACAVOY, ENERGY REGULATION BY THE FEDERAL POWER
COMMISSION 7-10, 66-71 (1974); Merton C. Bernstein, The NLRB's Adjudication-Rule Making Dilemma Un-
der the Administrative Procedure Act, 79 YALE L.J. 571, 578-81 (1970); LANDIS, supra note 19.
21. Atlantic Ref. Co. v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 360 U.S. 378, 389 (1959).
22. FPC's reliance on adjudication, for instance, contributed significantly to the gas shortage of the
1970's. See BREYER & MACAVOY, supra note 20, at 7-10, 66-71.
19961
3
Pierce: Rulemaking and the Administrative Procedure Act
Published by TU Law Digital Commons, 1996
TULSA LAW JOURNAL
The New Deal agencies' choice of procedures had two other unfortunate
consequences. First, by using judicial-type trials, the agencies focused their
attention on firm-specific, narrow historical facts as the primary basis for re-
solving all disputes. Effective regulatory systems depend instead on creation of
rules of conduct that are forward looking and instrumental. The agency should
not be asking: What did regulated firm A do five years ago? Instead, it should
be asking: How can I influence the future conduct of all regulated firms in
socially beneficial ways? Second, by choosing to rely on lengthy, labor inten-
sive decisionmaking procedures, the New Deal agencies created a regulatory
environment in which regulated firms were the only entities with the incentive
and ability to participate effectively in regulatory proceedings.2 That, in turn,
contributed greatly to the phenomenon of "capture," i.e., the agencies became
the de facto agents of the industries they were assigned to regulate.24 In this
environment, agencies organized industry cartels that were effective in extract-
ing monopoly rents from the public;' precisely the opposite of the agencies'
statutory missions.
INCREASED AGENCY USE OF RULES AND RULEMAKINGS
Agency use of rulemaking began to increase significantly in the 1960s and
1970s in response to two major developments. First, scholars documented the
poor performance of the New Deal agencies, linked that poor performance in
part to the agencies' choice of procedures, and urged the agencies to switch to
primary reliance on-rules and rulemaking to improve their performance. 6 The
writings of Kenneth Culp Davis were particularly influential in this effort."' He
recognized the critical distinction between adjudicative facts and legislative
facts and explained how agencies could improve their performance and reduce
dramatically the cost and length of regulatory proceedings by applying that
distinction to support issuance of instrumental, conduct-shaping rules.28 He
also documented the high risk that agencies would abuse their discretion in the
absence of rules and illustrated the many ways in which rules can enhance fair-
ness and predictability by limiting agency discretion.29
Scholars documented an impressive encyclopedia of the advantages of
rules and rulemaking. 0 Those advantages can be summarized under the fol-
23. See generally MANCUR OLSON, THE LOGIC OF COLLECTIVE ACTION: PUBLIC GOODS AND THE THEO-
RY OF GROUPS (1971).
24. See 3 DAVIS & PIERCE, supra note 1, § 16.12.
25. See ROBERT C. FELLMETH ET AL., THE INTERSTATE COMMERCE OMISSION: THE PUBLIC INTEREST
AND THE ICC 311-325 (1970); David Boies, Jr., Experiment in Mercantilism: Minimum Rate Regulation by
the Interstate Commerce Commission, 68 COLUM. L. REV. 599, 606 (1968).
26. See sources cited supra in note 20.
27. See generally KENNETH CULl DAVIS, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE (Ist ed. 1958 & 2d ed.
1984).
28. See Kenneth Culp Davis, An Approach to Problems of Evidence in the Administrative Process, 55
HARV. L. REV. 364, 402-23 (1942).
29. See KENNETH CULP DAVIS, DISCRETIONARY JUSTICE: A PRELIMINARY INQUIRY (1969).
30. See I DAVIS & PIERCE, supra note 1, § 6.7.
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lowing general headings: (1) rules provide a valuable source of decisional stan-
dards and constraints on agency discretion; (2) rules enhance efficiency by
simplifying and expediting agency enforcement efforts; (3) rules enhance fair-
ness by providing affected members of the public easily accessible, clear notice
of the demarcation between permissible and impermissible conduct and by
insuring like treatment of similarly situated individuals and firms; (4)
rulemaking enhances the quality of agency policy decisions because it focuses
on the broad effects of alternative rules and invites participation by all poten-
tially affected groups and individuals; (5) rulemaking enhances efficiency by
allowing an agency to resolve recurring issues of legislative fact once instead of
relitigating such issues in numerous cases; (6) rulemaking enhances fairness by
allowing all potentially affected members of the public to participate in the
decisionmaking process that determines the rules that apply to their conduct;
and (7) rulemaking enhances the political accountability and legitimacy of agen-
cy policy making by providing the general public, the President, and members
of Congress advance notice of an agency's intent to make major policy deci-
sions and an opportunity to influence the policies ultimately chosen by the
agency.
Many judges and justices joined with scholars in urging agencies to in-
crease their reliance on rules. In part, they were influenced by the scholarly
writings that demonstrated the benefits of rules and rulemaking. In part, they
were influenced by their own frustrating experiences with agencies whose per-
formance vascilated between ineffective and counterproductive because of their
reliance on judicial-type trials in inappropriate contexts. For a decade, Justices
Douglas and Harlan waged a campaign to convince a majority of the Court to
announce a doctrine that would compel an agency to act by rule in all circum-
stances in which that option was available.3 That effort ultimately failed for
purely pragmatic reasons,32 but the judiciary put agencies on notice that they
should rethink their choice of procedures and increase their use of rules and
rulemaking.
The second major development that increased agency use of rules and
rulemaking was the enactment of a plethora of statutes that created many new
agencies with missions quite different from those assigned the New Deal agen-
cies.33 The new health, safety, and environmental regulatory agencies did not
share the New Deal agencies' traditional attachment to judicial-type
decisionmaking procedures. These agencies were led by a new generation of
technocrats who had already internalized the advantages of rules as the primary
means of shaping conduct. Their missions did not lend themselves to adjudica-
tion in any event. It is hard to imagine the Environmental Protection Agency
31. See, e.g., NLRB v. Wyman-Gordon Co., 394 U.S. 759, 777-78 (1969) (Douglas, J., dissenting); id. at
781-82 (Harlan, J., dissenting); California v. Lo-Vaca Gathering Co., 379 U.S. 366, 376-77 (1965) (Harlan, J.
dissenting).
32. See 1 DAvis & PIERCE, supra note 1, § 6.8.
33. See id. § 1.6.
1996]
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("EPA"), for instance, attempting to pursue its mission to improve the nation's
air quality through use of the procedures traditionally employed by the New
Deal agencies. The EPA would have to conduct a separate trial-type hearing to
determine the emissions limits applicable to each of millions of sources of air
pollution - an impossible task.
Moreover, the Congress that created the new agencies had become frustrat-
ed with the poor performance of the New Deal agencies. It recognized the
powerful relationship between that performance and the agencies' choice of
procedures.34 The statutes that created the new agencies and assigned them
new missions specifically instructed the agencies to make extensive use of rules
and rulemaking. Indeed, the Clean Air Act includes explicit instructions to the
EPA to issue hundreds of rules to govern myriad circumstances within statutori-
ly imposed action deadlines."
Agency reliance on rules and rulemaking increased dramatically in re-
sponse to these two developments.36 Even most of the New Deal agencies be-
gan to rely primarily on rules to further their assigned missions, often with
outstanding results. The Federal Energy Regulatory Commission ("FERC") and
its New Deal predecessor, the Federal Power Commission ("FPC"), provide a
particularly good illustration of the socially beneficial effects of this shift in
decisionmaking procedures. The FPC's use of adjudication to regulate the natu-
ral gas industry produced a decade long gas shortage that cost the U.S. econo-
my billions of dollars per year.37 By abandoning reliance on adjudication and
issuing a series of carefully crafted rules, FERC has now created a gas market
in which robust competition yields aggressive innovation, unparalled efficiency,
abundant supplies, and low prices.38
The proponents of rules and rulemaking were euphoric about the apparent
complete acceptance and successful implementation of their innovation. Ken-
neth Culp Davis issued a jubilant proclamation of victory in 1978 that typified
the spirit of the times.39 He-referred to his 1970 assertion that the procedure
for administrative rulemaking is "one of the greatest inventions of modern
government."'  He then rejoiced over the developments between 1970 and
1978:
Indeed, of all the tools that government has for carrying out programs
enacted by the legislative body, rulemaking procedure is rapidly becoming
the dominant one. During coming decades, the prospect is that govern-
34. See BRUCE A. ACKERMAN & WILLIAM T. HASSLER, CLEAN COAL/DIRTY AIR, chs. 1-4 (1981).
35. See id.
36. See 1 DAVIS & PIERCE, supra note 1, § 1.6.
37. See BREYER & MAcAvoY, supra note 20, at 7-10, 66-71.
38. See Richard J. Pierce, Jr., The State of the Transition to Competitive Markets in Natural Gas and
Electricity, 15 ENERGY LJ. 323 (1994); Richard 3. Pierce, Jr., Reconstituting the Natural Gas Industry from
Wellhead to Burnertip, 9 ENERGY L.J. 1 (1988).
39. See I KENNETH CULP DAVIS, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE § 6.1 (2d ed. 1978).
40. Id. at 448.
[Vol. 32:185
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ments all over the world will adopt American ideas about rulemaking as a
mainstay of governmental machinery.4
Alas, that declaration of complete victory was to prove overly optimistic. It
is certainly true that rulemaking was enjoying a period of rapid ascendance,
driven by pursuit of the traditional U.S. cultural values of efficiency, fairness,
and accountability. At the same time, however, the competing cultural force,
distrust of government, was beginning to manifest itself in the form of doctrinal
developments and legislative actions that would place in severe jeopardy the
continuing viability of "one of the greatest inventions of modem government."
THE DOCTRINAL AND POLITICAL SEEDS OF RULEMAKING OSSIFICATION
Modem administrative law scholarship devotes extensive attention to the
phenomenon referred to as ossification of rulemaking: the increasing agency
aversion to use of the rulemaking procedure.' Scholars began to document
that phenomenon in the 1980s, 4" but its roots lie in a series of judicial and legis-
lative actions that took place in the 1960s and 1970s, the very period in which
most administrative law scholars believed that rulemaking had achieved unstop-
pable momentum. Moreover, with the benefit of hindsight, it is now easy to
describe those changes in legal doctrine and statutes as symptomatic of pow-
erful political, social, and cultural forces that are likely to render impossible any
complete and enduring victory by the proponents of rulemaking procedures as
an efficient and dominant component of the machinery of government.
The Supreme Court announced two major changes in administrative law
doctrines in 1967 and 1970, that had profound effects on the viability of
rulemaking. In Abbott Laboratories v. Gardner," the Court announced a pre-
sumption that rules are subject to pre-enforcement judicial review. 5 In Associ-
ation of Data Processing Service Organizations, Inc. v. Camp,' the Court an-
nounced a new standing test that had the effect of expanding dramatically the
categories of individuals, firms, trade associations, and public interest groups
that could obtain judicial review of agency rules. 7
In combination, these two doctrinal changes transformed completely the
legal environment in which agencies conducted rulemakings. Before Abbott and
41. Id. at 448-49.
42. See, e.g., Paul R. Verkuil, Rulemaking Ossification -A Modest Proposal, 47 ADMIN. L. REV. 453
(1995); Richard J. Pierce, Jr., Seven Ways to Deossify Agency Rulemaking, 47 ADMIN. L. REV. 59 (1995);
CARNEGIE COMMISSION, RISK AND THE ENVIRONMENT: IMPROVING REGULATORY DECISIONMAKING 107
(1993); Thomas 0. McGarity, Some Thoughts on "Deossifying" the Rulemaking Process, 41 DUKE L.J. 1385
(1992); JERRY L. MASHAW & DAVID L. HARFST, THE STRUGGLE FOR AUTO SAFETY (1990); JOHN M.
MENDELOFF, THE DILEMMA OF Toxic SUBSTANCE REGULATION (1988).
43. See, e.g., Richard J. Pierce, Jr., Two Problems in Administrative Law: Political Polarity on the Dis-
trict of Columbia Circuit and Judicial Deterrence of Agency Rulemaking, 1988 DUKE L.J. 300, 303.
44. 387 U.S. 136 (1967).
45. See id. at 139-48.
46. 397 U.S. 150 (1970). See also Hunt v. Washington State Apple Adver. Comm'n, 432 U.S. 333, 342
(1977) (holding that associations have standing to assert the interests of their members).
47. See Camp, 397 U.S. at 153-54.
. 1996]
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Camp, agency rules rarely were subjected to judicial review. Review was avail-
able only at the behest of regulatees. They could obtain review only by defying
the agency, violating the rule, and then attempting to defend their conduct by
challenging the validity of the rule. That strategy rarely worked and almost
invariably produced intolerable costs and risks for the regulatees. Moreover, on
those rare occasions when a court reviewed an agency rule, it did so in the
context of a proceeding to enforce the rule against a particular regulatee. The
only "record" the court used as the basis for review was the record of the en-
forcement proceeding. Given the manner in which agencies exercised their
enforcement discretion, that record provided a poor basis for an argument that
the rule was invalid. Typically, the regulatee had violated a rule in circumstanc-
es in which the violation produced obvious significant harm to the public. A
court was unlikely to hold a rule invalid in such circumstances.
The doctrinal changes announced in Abbott and Camp changed every as-
pect of that environment. Henceforth, agencies had reason to expect that every
major rule would be the subject of judicial review, usually at the behest of
numerous parties with widely disparate interests. A major rule issued today
often is subject to scores of petitions for review filed by parties who challenge
the validity of the rule on scores of theories. Moreover, agencies could antici-
pate that reviewing courts would begin to insist that agencies provide some
form of "record" to be used as the basis for pre-enforcement review of a rule.
As Paul Verkuil predicted,' reviewing courts responded to Abbott by de-
manding that agencies support rules with increasingly elaborate records.49 The
required rulemaking record consisted of the notice of proposed rulemaking, the
comments submitted in response to the notice, the statement of the rule's basis
and purpose, and all studies the agency relied upon to support the factual predi-
cates of the rule."0 In a particularly significant opinion, the D.C. Circuit cau-
tioned agencies not to take literally the adjectives "concise" and "general" used
in the APA to describe the required statement of a rule's basis and purpose."'
The court referred to the far more extensive support required by the realities of
the process of judicial review.52 In other opinions, circuit courts held that an
agency rule was arbitrary and capricious unless the agency responded adequate-
ly to all well-supported objections, criticisms, and alternatives contained in the
comments submitted in response to an agency's notice of proposed
rulemaking.53 Those judicially-imposed obligations provided parties who are
interested in the outcome of a rulemaking a powerful incentive to submit volu-
minous comments that include multiple objections, criticisms, and proposed
48. See Paul R. Verkuil, Judicial Review of Informal Rulemaking; 60 VA. L. REV. 185, 198 (1974).
49. See I DAvIs & PIERCE, supra note 1, §§ 7.3-.4.
50. See id. §§ 7.3-.4.
51. See Automotive Parts & Accessories Ass'n v. Boyd, 407 F.2d 330, 338 (D.C. Cir. 1968).
52. See id.
53. See, e.g., National Tire Dealers & Retreaders Ass'n v. Brinegar, 491 F.2d 31, 35 (D.C. Cir. 1974);
Chrysler Corp. v. Department of Transp., 472 F.2d 659, 665 (6th Cir. 1972); Scenic Hudson Preservation
Conf. v. Federal Power Comm'n, 354 F.2d 608, 620 (2d Cir. 1965). See generally sources cited supra note
42.
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alternatives, each supported by lengthy studies and arguments. Rulemaking
records soon mushroomed from a few hundred pages of comments to tens of
thousands of pages of comments, including many conflicting studies that chal-
lenged the major factual predicates for the proposed rule. In order to have any
chance of defending the validity of a major rule in this legal environment, agen-
cies had to issue "concise, general" statements of basis and purpose hundreds of
pages long addressing at length the scores of issues raised in comments. This
approach to judicial review of agency rules became known as "hard look" re-
view.
Some courts, most notably the D.C. Circuit, concluded that even "hard
look" review, and the voluminous record it created, was inadequate to support a
major rule. Courts began to demand that agencies supplement that record with
the transcript of an oral evidentiary hearing in which the agency and the inter-
ested parties presented testimony, subject to cross-examination, on the most
important and controversial issues raised in the proceeding." This method of
judicial review created something called "hybrid rulemaking" in which the
agency combined the features of the informal rulemaking process with many of
the features of a formal adjudication. This method of review also created a legal
environment in which agencies were extremely reluctant to initiate a rulemaking
for fear that the proceeding would require a decade or more to complete in a
manner that offered any realistic prospect of a favorable outcome on judicial
review.
Congress also began to lose its enthusiasm for the informal rulemaking
procedure, at least in the context of some agencies. As agencies began to make
increasing use of rules and rulemaking, some did so in a manner that angered
powerful constituencies. The Federal Trade Commission ("FTC"), for instance,
initiated several rulemakings in the same time period in which it proposed to
regulate the practices of soft drink bottlers, used car dealers, and funeral homes.
Its proposals may have been justified in each case, but its decision to take on
three powerful constituencies at the same time proved to be political suicide. In
a statute euphemistically entitled the "FTC Improvement Act," Congress effec-
tively withdrew the FTC's power to issue rules by requiring the agency to sup-
plement informal rulemaking procedures with oral evidentiary hearings that
address "disputed issues of material fact."55 Congress enacted similar amend-
ments to the statutes that govern rulemakings conducted by several other agen-
cies whose actions had triggered that traditional U.S. cultural value, distrust of
government. 6 Each of these efforts to destroy rulemaking by claiming to im-
54. See, e.g., Mobil Oil Corp. v. Federal Power Comm'n, 483 F.2d 1238, 1250 (D.C. Cir. 1973): Interna-
tional Harvester Co. v. Ruckelshaus, 478 F.2d 615, 629 (D.C. Cir. 1973); Appalachian Power Co. v. EPA.
477 F.2d 495, 501 (4th Cir. 1973); Walter Holm & Co. v. Hardin, 449 F.2d 1009, 1015 (D.C. Cir. 1971).
55. 15 U.S.C. § 57(a) (1994).
56. See I DAVIS & PIERCE, supra note 1, § 7.7.
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prove it was successful. 7 Each was inspired by Senator Fullbright's successful
effort to destroy the Walsh-Healy Act in 1952."8 He sponsored an amendment
to the Act that required the Department of Labor ("DOL") to use formal
rulemaking procedures to issue rules to implement the Act. The DOL quickly
discovered that it is impossible to use rules to implement a statute if the re-
quired rulemaking procedure includes the right to an oral evidentiary hearing. 9
That has been the universal experience of agencies that are required to provide
oral hearings as part of the procedure for issuing a rule.'
THE SUPREME COURT RESCUES RULEMAKING
The Supreme Court issued two landmark opinions in the 1970s that had
the effect of eliminating the two most serious judicial threats to the continued
viability of rulemaking. Until 1973, most agencies believed that they were
required to use formal rulemaking procedures, including an oral evidentiary
hearing, if a statute authorized them to act only after providing an opportunity
for a "hearing." This belief, reinforced by some judicial decisions,61 acted as a
powerful deterrent to the use of rulemakings by the many agencies whose stat-
utes conditioned their power to act on provision of a "hearing." In United States
v. Florida East Coast Railway,62 the Court eliminated this powerful deterrent
to the use of rulemaking by holding that the requirement of a "hearing" can be
satisfied by provision of informal rulemaking procedures. 3
After Florida East Coast, however, circuit courts continued to coerce agen-
cies into using formal rulemaking, or "hybrid rulemaking," by insisting that
agencies provide the kind of "record" in support of a rule that could only be
created by conducting an oral evidentiary hearing.' The Court brought that
practice to a halt with its 1978 decision in Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power
Corp. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc.65 The Court held that courts
lack the power to compel agencies to use procedures for rulemaking beyond
those required by the APA.'
57. See generally Teresa M. Schwartz, The Consumer Product Safety Commission: A Flawed Product of
the Consumer Decade, 51 GEo. WASH. L. REv. 32 (1982); Barry B. Boyer, Trade Regulation Rulemaking
Procedures of the Federal Trade Commission, 1979 ADMINISTRATIVE CONFERENCE OF THE UNITED STATES:
RECOMMENDATIONS AND REPORTS 41; Jerry L. Mashaw, Reinventing Government and Regulatory Reform:
Studies in the Neglect and Abuse of Administrative Law, 57 U. PIrr. L. REV. 405, 416-17 (1996).
58. See Robert W. Hamilton, Procedures for the Adoption of Rules of General Applicability: The Need
for Procedural Innovation in Administrative Rulemaking, 60 CAL. L. REV. 1276, 1306 (1972).
59. See id. at 1305.
60. See Mashaw, supra note 57, at 416-17.
61. See, e.g., Cates v. Haderlein, 342 U.S. 804 (1951); Riss & Co. v. United States, 341 U.S. 907
(1951).
62. 410 U.S. 224 (1973).
63. See id. at 240.
64. See cases cited supra note 54.
65. 435 U.S. 519 (1978). See also Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass'n of U.S., Inc. v. State Farm Mutual Auto.
Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29, 40 (1983) (stating that motor vehicle safety standards are to be promulgated under the
informal rulemaking provisions of the APA).
66. See Vermont Yankee, 435 U.S. at 520.
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Without the Court's decisions in Florida East Coast and Vermont Yankee,
rulemaking probably would have disappeared as a viable mechanism by the
early 1980s. The Court's efforts to salvage rulemaking were only partially suc-
cessful, however. It left intact the extraordinarily demanding "hard look" doc-
trine. As Paul Verkuil demonstrated in his analysis of Vermont Yankee, the
"hard look" doctrine is functionally equivalent to judicially-mandated use of
hybrid rulemaking.67 Reviewing courts can apply the infinitely malleable "hard
look" doctrine to create conditions in which rulemaking is not a viable option
because it is too expensive, time-consuming, and labor-intensive," particularly
when the resulting rule has less than a fifty percent probability of being upheld
by a reviewing court. 9
RULEMAKING OSSIFICATION
Jerry Mashaw and David Harfst concluded a meticulous study of the Na-
tional Highway Traffic Safety Administration ("NHTSA") in 1990.70 That
study demonstrated the devastating effect that "hard look" review of rules had
on one agency's ability to use rules and rulemakings to implement a regulatory
statute.7 ' Over time, the unrealistic demands imposed by reviewing courts cre-
ated an environment in which the NHTSA was extremely reluctant to use
rulemaking. The NHTSA substituted for rulemaking substantially less cost-
effective forms of regulation.7 1 Studies of numerous other agencies have docu-
mented analogous effects.73 The Carnegie Commission's 1993 report of its
study of the phenomenon summarizes well the many effects of "hard look"
review of rulemakings: (1) agencies require five years to issue, amend, or re-
scind a major rule; (2) many needed rules are never issued; (3) many obsolete
rules are never amended or rescinded; and (4) agencies substitute for rules a
variety of other regulatory devices that are inferior to rules in all respects. 4
Tom McGarity's term "rulemaking ossification" captures nicely the situation
that exists today. 5
Many scholars have proposed methods of restoring rulemaking as a viable
option.76 There are numerous potential ways of deossifying the rulemaking
process, but each imposes some collateral costs and each confronts a variety of
other obstacles.' There are some modest signs of improvement in the legal
67. See Paul R. Verkuil, Judicial Review of Informal Rulemaking: Waiting for Vermont Yankee 11, 55
TiL. L. REV. 418 (1981).
68. See sources cited supra note 42.
69. See Peter H. Schuck & E. Donald Elliott, To the Chevron Station: An Empirical Study of Federal
Administrative Law, 1990 DugE U. 984, 1022.
70. See MASHAW & HARFST, supra note 42.
71. See id. at 95-103.
72. See id. at 100.
73. See sources cited supra note 42.
74. See CARNEGIE COMMISSION, supra note 42, at 106-09.
75. See McGarity, supra note 42.
76. See sources cited supra note 42.
77. See Pierce, supra note 42.
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environment. The Supreme Court has issued two opinions in which it has re-
duced the discretion of reviewing courts to impose open-ended versions of the
"hard look" doctrine.78 Circuit courts seem to be exercising greater self-re-
straint in apparent recognition of the ossification phenomenon. In the meantime,
however, the suspicion of government that is deeply embedded in U.S. cultural
values is manifesting itself in another form that represents a serious threat to the
viability of rulemaking.
"REGULATORY REFORM" AND THE POTENTIAL FOR
PETRIFICATION OF RULEMAKING
In 1995, the House of Representatives passed, and the Senate fell only one
vote short of passing, an amendment to the rulemaking provision of the
APA.79 The proposed "regulatory reform" amendment is considerably longer
than the entire original APA. It would subject all "major rules," broadly de-
fined, to detailed, elaborate new decisionmaking procedures. At its core, the
amendment mandates cost-benefit analysis and risk assessment for all major
rules. If that were all the amendment required, it probably would not add much
to the pre-existing burdens of the rulemaking process, and its benefits, in the
form of better rules, might justify that modest incremental burden. Most agen-
cies have been routinely using cost-benefit analysis and risk assessment in the
process of issuing major rules for many years."
The proposed amendment goes much further, however. It prescribes in
meticulous detail elaborate procedures and criteria applicable to each of the
many new analytical steps an agency must take before it can issue a major rule.
Moreover, each step and criterion is to be interpreted and applied by reviewing
courts. This version of "regulatory reform" would have the effect of transform-
ing rulemaking ossification into rulemaking petrification." Good faith agency
efforts to comply with the proposed new amendment would significantly in-
crease the already daunting cost of the rulemaking process, measured both in
years and in staff resources. At the same time, as Judge Wald has pointed out,
the proposed amendment inevitably would increase the proportion of major
rules that reviewing courts reject.8 Generalist judges, with little understanding
78. See Mobil Oil Exploration & Producing Southeast, Inc. v. United Distribution Cos., 498 U.S. 211
(1991); Pension Benefit Guaranty Corp. v. LTV Corp., 496 U.S. 633 (1990).
79. See Job Creation and Wage Enhancement Act, H.R. 9, 104th Cong. (1995); Comprehensive Regula-
tory Reform Act, S. 343, 104th Cong. (1995).
80. See Sally Katzen, Administration Perspectives on the 1995 Regulatory Reform Legislation, 48
ADMIN. L. REV. 331 (1996); Sylvia K. Lowrance, Risk Assessment Perspectives from the Agency View, 48
ADMIN. L. REV. 345 (1996).
81. See Richard J. Pierce, Jr., The APA and Regulatory Reform, 10 ADMIN. L.J. AM. U. 81 (1996):
Mashaw, supra note 57, at 416-417; Peter Strauss, Risk Assessment Perspectives, 48 ADMIN. L. REV. 341. 347
(1996); Ronald Levin, Judicial Review of Procedural Compliance, 48 ADMIN. L. REV. 359, 361 (1996).
82. See Patricia M. Wald, Judicial Review: Talking Points, 48 ADMIN. L. REV. 350, 351 (1996).
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of cost-benefit analysis or risk assessment," would feel obliged to attempt to
insure that agencies have performed those functions in conformance with the
detailed, technical specifications in the proposed amendment. The present fifty
percent rate of judicial rejection of agency rules would soar to perhaps seventy
or eighty percent.8 4 The results are easy to predict: petrification of the
rulemaking process.
The same proposed amendment that would create a legal environment in
which rulemaking is no longer a viable option also would mandate systematic
agency review of pre-existing rules. The proponents of the amendment appear
to believe that agencies simply choose not to review existing rules to determine
whether they should be amended or rescinded. Solid empirical work refutes that
belief." Agencies would like to devote more resources to the important task of
reviewing existing rules and to the related tasks of amending or rescinding the
many obsolete rules. The powerful impediments they confront are resource con-
straints and burdensome rulemaking procedures. As Congress piles more and
more mandates on agencies' plates, and couples those mandates with increas-
ingly burdensome procedural requirements, it is simultaneously reducing signifi-
cantly the resources it provides agencies to accomplish their assigned tasks.86 It
is unimaginable that agencies would be able to comply with both the proposed
new statutory mandate to engage in systematic review of existing rules and the
proposed new procedures for issuing rules with fewer resources than they have
today. Enactment of the proposed amendment to the APA's rulemaking provi-
sions would represent a complete triumph of the traditional U.S. suspicion of
government. We would have succeeded in creating checks on the rulemaking
process so powerful that agencies would not attempt to issue, amend, or rescind
rules.
AN OPTIMISTIC ALTERNATIVE FUTURE FOR RULEMAKING
I have painted an unduly grim picture of the future of rulemaking in the
prior section, however. After all, Congress has not yet enacted the proposed
amendment to the APA I criticize. It might choose to move in an entirely dif-
ferent direction. Congress, like the society it represents, is intensely ambivalent
about potential methods of reconciling our traditional suspicion of government
83. For a particularly good example of the inability of courts to understand scientific disputes, see Indus-
trial Union Department v. American Petroleum Institute, 448 U.S. 607, 655 (1980). The Court attempts to
illustrate the difference between a risk that is clearly significant and a risk that is clearly insignificant by
describing an example of each. It is obvious, however, to anyone who understands toxicology and risk assess-
ment, that the risk the Court considers insignificant is larger than the risk the Court considers significant.
84. See sources cited supra note 80. This feature of the proposed amendment is described and analyzed
in Leslie Kux, Looking Back at Existing Rules: Agency Perspectives on Analysis Requirements, 48 ADMIN L.
REv. 375 (1996).
85. See Sidney A. Shapiro, Agency Priority Setting and the Review of Existing Agency Rules, 48 ADMIN.
L. REv. 370 (1996); Neil R. Eisner & Judith S. Kaleta, Federal Agency Reviews of Existing Regulations, 48
ADMIN. L. REV. 139 (1996).
86. See Richard J. Pierce, Jr., Judicial Review of Agency Actions in a Period of Diminishing Agency
Resources, 49 ADMIN. L. REv. (forthcoming Dec. 1996).
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with our traditional pursuit of a government that is efficient, fair, and account-
able. In 1996, Congress enacted an amendment to the APA that could lead to a
far better method of merging those often conflicting social values.87
The enacted amendment adds a new chapter to the APA entitled "Congres-
sional Review of Agency Rulemaking."88 It requires agencies to submit all
major rules to Congress at least sixty days before a rule's effective date.89
Congress is then obligated to review each rule.' If a rule does not conform
with Congress' preferences, Congress can "veto" it by enacting a joint resolu-
tion of disapproval.9 The amendment establishes expedited procedures for
considering such a resolution. The expedited procedures render unavailable the
tactical weapons that opponents of legislation use most frequently to block, or
to stall, legislative initiatives that have majority support.
With the addition of the new congressional review chapter of the APA, we
now have in place two-thirds of a new legal environment that would combine
our social values in a new way so as to maximize our ability to further those
values simultaneously.' We have had systematic Presidential review of major
rules for over a dozen years.93 Beginning in 1996, Presidential review will co-
exist with systematic Congressional review. As a result, an agency can issue a
major rule only if it survives review by both of the politically accountable
branches of government. That process certainly should satisfy our desire for
accountability of rules. We can hold the elected officials of both branches ac-
countable for any rule that we dislike. It also responds effectively to our inher-
ent suspicion of government and to our craving for checks on the power of
government officials. A rule can be issued through this process only if it is
initiated by one institution, an agency; approved by another, the President; and
acquiesced in by a third, our bicameral Legislature.
At the same time, the new rulemaking process will further the social goals
of enhancing efficiency and fairness in government operations. It will have this
effect by creating an environment in which agencies can maximize their reli-
ance on rules and rulemakings: the primary sources of efficiency and fairness in
implementing benefit programs and regulatory programs. Our elected officials
in the White House and on Capital Hill will approve the vast majority of agen-
cy rules. My prediction in this respect may seem counterintuitive given the
persistent criticism of agencies' performance by the leaders of whichever party
controls Congress. The two phenomena are consistent, however. Carping about
the performance of agencies is a low political cost activity. Indeed, it can yield
political dividends for congressional leaders when the other party controls the
87. See Small Business Regulatory Enforcement Fairness Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-121, §§ 201-253,
1996 U.S.C.C.A.N. (110 Stat.) 857-74.
88. See id. § 251, 1996 U.S.C.C.A.N. (110 Stat.) at 868-74 (to be codified at 5 U.S.C. §§ 801-808).
89. See id. § 251, 1996 U.S.C.C.A.N. (110 Stat.) at 869 (to be codified at 5 U.S.C. § 801).
90. See id. § 251, 1996 U.S.C.C.A.N. (110 Stat.) at 868 (to be codified at 5 U.S.C. § 801).
91. See id. § 251, 1996 U.S.C.C.A.N. (110 Stat.) at 871 (to be codified at 5 U.S.C. § 802).
92. See Verkuil, supra note 42, at 458.
93. See I DAVIS & PIERCE, supra note 1, § 7.9.
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White House: a situation that has become the norm in recent decades. Disap-
proving an agency rule carries much higher potential costs than merely criticiz-
ing an agency rule. Most rules have powerful beneficiaries, and congressional
leaders can anticipate that the agency and the White House will assist those
beneficiaries in orchestrating a public outcry if Congress vetoes a rule that
would confer significant benefits on the public. Members of Congress will be
reluctant to risk incurring the high political costs of such an outcry.
I have described the legal environment created by enactment of the new
congressional review chapter of the APA as providing two-thirds of an ideal
new environment conducive to use of rules and rulemaking. The missing one-
third consists of a characteristic of the present legal environment that is incom-
patible with the new environment. Traditionally, we have asked the judiciary to
play a broad role in the rulemaking process. Indeed, we have asked more of the
judiciary than it is institutionally capable of providing. Judicial review of rules
through application of the open-ended "hard look" version of the amorphous
"arbitrary and capricious" standard is the primary source of the phenomenon of
rulemaking ossification.94 It greatly increases the cost and delay attendant to
agency use of rulemaking, with little pay off. Generalist judges lack both the
technical expertise and the time required to understand the relationship among
the many complicated issues that are raised in a major rulemaking.95 Agencies
have a clear comparative advantage over courts in that respect. The judiciary is
the least politically accountable branch of government. Presidential and Con-
gressional review of agency rules is vastly superior to judicial review as a
means of ensuring that rules reflect the preferences of the people.96 As Judge
Wald argued persuasively in 1981, rulemaking is, and must be, an inherently
political process.97 If the President approves a rule and the Congress acquiesc-
es in the rule, we know who to hold accountable if the rule yields adverse
effects, and we have access to the most effective tool ever invented to insure
political accountability: the ballot box.
With the addition of the congressional review chapter to the APA, then, we
need to make only one further change in law to deossify rulemaking. Courts
should be limited to two narrow, but important roles, in the rulemaking process.
They should retain the power to hold a rule unconstitutional, and they should
retain the power to hold a rule invalid because it is inconsistent with a statute.
As Justice (then-Professor) Breyer pointed out in 1986, those are the roles in
which the judicial branch has comparative advantages over other branches.9"
By retaining the rarely exercised power to hold a rule unconstitutional, courts
94. See sources cited supra note 42.
95. See Pierce, supra note 42, at 68-71.
96. See Richard J. Pierce, Jr., The Role of the Judiciary in Implementing an Agency Theory of Govern-
ment, 64 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1239 (1989).
97. See Sierra Club v. Costle, 657 F. 2d 298, 400-10 (D.C. Cir. 1981). See also Paul R. Verkuil, Jaw-
boning Administrative Agencies: Ex Parte Contacts by the White House, 80 COLUM. L. REV. 943 (1980).
98. See Stephen Breyer, Judicial Review of Questions of Law and Policy, 38 ADMIN. L. REV. 363
(1986).
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will remain in a position to play their crucial counter-majoritarian role.9 By
retaining the power to hold that a rule is invalid because it is contrary to a
statute, courts will remain in a position to preserve the vital principle of Legis-
lative Supremacy by insuring that a statute cannot be enacted or amended ex-
cept through the constitutionally prescribed process of bicameral action and
presentment.1°°
Congress could accomplish this socially beneficial change in law through
an incredibly easy step. It needs only to amend the APA by making section
706(2)(A) inapplicable to rules that are-subject to the new congressional review
process. Section 706(2)(A) authorizes a court to set aside an agency action that
a court determines to be arbitrary, capricious, or an abuse of discretion."°"
That section should continue to apply to agency adjudications, both because
there is considerable potential for agency abuse of the adjudicatory process"
and because decisions in adjudications are not appropriate candidates for con-
gressional review. 3 The existence of presidential and congressional review of
major rules renders redundant and counter productive, however, retention of a
broad role for the judiciary in that context."4
Alternatively, the judiciary itself can create the final one-third of this vast-
ly improved new legal environment. The "hard look" version of the arbitrary
and capricious test is entirely a product of the judicial branch.' The Court
could eliminate that judge-made doctrine and replace it with the highly deferen-
tial version of the arbitrary and capricious test that existed when Congress en-
acted the APA in 1946." The Justices should find that course of action ap-
pealing. Such an interpretation of the APA would be far more faithful both to
the language of the Act 7 and to the intent of the Congress that enacted the
APA than the interpretation that has evolved in recent decades.0 3
THE FUTURE OF RULEMAKING
Now that I have described two dramatically different future legal environ-
ments applicable to rules and rulemaking and expressed my normative views on
those alternative futures, I suppose I have an obligation to predict the actual
environment that will exist in the future. I can do no better than to end this
essay where I began. Peter Strauss has described the political, social, and cultur-
99. See ALEXANDER M. BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH 16-23 (1962).
100. See Daniel A. Farber, Statutory Interpretation and Legislative Supremacy, 78 GEO. L.J, 281, 308-09
(1989).
101. See 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A) (1994).
102. See 2, 3 DAVIS & PIERCE, supra note 1, §§ 11.5, 17.1-.2.
103. See 2 id. §§ 8.4, 9.2, 9.8.
104. See Pierce, supra note 42, at 66-71.
105. See Pierce, supra note 86; 1 DAVIS & PIERCE, supra note 1, § 7.4.
106. See Pacific States Box & Basket Co. v. White, 296 U.S. 176 (1935).
107. Section 553 of the APA requires only that an agency incorporate in each rule "a concise general
statement of [its] basis and purpose." 5 U.S.C. § 553(c) (1994).
108. See Martin Shapiro, APA: Past, Present, and Future, 72 VA. L. REV. 447 (1986).
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al forces that are the roots of our intense ambivalence toward rules and
rulemaking.t" There is no reason to expect those forces to abate. Instead, they
will continue to manifest themselves in myriad ways that will create perpetual
tension between the proponents of rules and rulemakings and the skeptics
whose distrust of government will induce them to create new obstacles to the
issuance of rules.
109. See Strauss, supra note 2.
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